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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 March 1953

**SUBJECT: SE-41: PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
POSSIBLE UN/US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR**

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable military and political reactions of Communist China and the USSR to certain possible UN/US military courses of action with respect to the Korean war.

DRAFT OUTLINE OF PAPER

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVES OF THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA AND THEIR INTERESTS IN KOREA

A. Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist objectives

1. Defense and consolidation of their territories and regimes.
2. Elimination of the West from Asia.
3. Advancement of world communism by weakening and dividing non-Communist world.
4. Etc., etc.

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D. The relation of Korea to over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist objectives

1. Soviet and Chinese Communist interests in Korea (both joint and separate).
2. The value the Communists attach to: the POW issue; physical possession of North Korean territory; the continued existence of the North Korean regime; and the security of the economic assets of Manchuria.
3. The extent to which the probable Communist desire to avoid global war would override Communist objectives and interests in Korea if the Communist position in Korea were endangered.

II. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US/UN COURSES OF ACTION WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE EXPANSION OF THE WAR BEYOND KOREA

A. Alternative I

If the UN/US were to continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

1. Effect of this course on present Communist military and diplomatic policies in Korea.
2. Extent to which the USSR and Communist China would continue to cooperate in conduct of war.

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B. Alternative II

If the UN/US were to maintain current restrictions on operations but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

1. Effect of this course on present Communist military and diplomatic policies in Korea.
2. Probable Communist military reactions, and consequent risk of expansion of the war.
3. Probable Communist political reactions.
4. Extent to which the USSR and Communist China would continue to cooperate in conduct of war.

III. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US/UN COURSES OF ACTION WHICH INVOLVE EXPANSION OF THE WAR BEYOND KOREA

A. Alternative III

If the UN/US were to remove current restrictions on operations and extend and intensify military pressure on the enemy by stages (including air attack, naval blockade and economic embargo directly against Communist China) and, if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

B. Alternative IV

If the UN/US were to undertake such military action as would be required, including a ground offensive in Korea, naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Communist China, to inflict maximum possible destruction of enemy forces in Korea and thereafter to achieve a more defensible line north of the 38th parallel.

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C. Alternative V

If the UN/US were to undertake such military action as would be required, including a large-scale ground offensive in Korea, air and naval attacks and naval blockade directly against Communist China, with a view to defeating and destroying all communist forces in Korea, and achieving a unified non-Communist Korea.

1. Probable Communist military reactions to UN/US undertaking of any of these courses of action.
 - a. Initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions.
 - b. Extent to which Communist reactions to each of these UN/US courses of action might be modified by the degree of success gained by UN/US forces.
 - c. Possible Communist reactions elsewhere in world, as, for example, against Hong Kong.
 - d. Extent to which these reactions would risk general war.
2. Probable Communist political reactions to UN/US undertaking of any of these courses of action.
 - a. Political warfare throughout world, including possible Communist subversion, revolutionary attempts, as, for example, in Hong Kong, SEA, Iran.

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- b. Reaction with respect to an armistice.
- c. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by UN/US forces.

3. Probable effect on Sino-Soviet relations.

- a. Extent to which success of UN/US operations would affect.
- b. Strains likely to grow out of Soviet and Chinese Communist military and political reactions to UN/US operations.
- c. Strains likely to grow out of conflicting views toward armistice.

4. Effect upon above Communist reactions in the event that:

- a. The UN powers refused to participate in these operations.
- b. Atomic weapons were employed.

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